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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J. WENDELL MARRIOT, 
Administrator of the Estate of 
Russell L. Marriott, Deceased, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SKYLINE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
INC., a corporation; OPERATING ENGI-
NEERS LOCAL UNION NO. 3 of the 
INTL UNION OF OPERA TING ENG., 
a corporation; and OPERATING ENG. 
TRUST FUND FOR UTAH, a corporation, 
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY CO., an In-
surance Company; and PACIFIC NA-
TIONAL LIFE ASSURANCE CO., an In-
surance Company, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
11879 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
AND APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is a suit for Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.0Q) 
in life insurance coverage and Two Thousand Dollars 
($2,000.00) accidental death benefit against the Defend-
ants excepting Skyline Construction Company which was 
found to have no liability. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, ruled in favor of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
I 
Judgment and against Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint. Pbintiff 
then filed a Motion to Rehear and also to enter Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and for Judgment to he 
entered in favor of the Plaintiff. Said Motion wa<; heord 
by the Court on September 15, 1969, and denied. 
RELIEF REQUESTED ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff requests reversal of the Judgment of 
the loweri Court and for finding in favor of the Plaintiff 
and granting of Judgment thereon, or in the alternative 
to remand to the District Court for trial on the issues. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Upon ordering of the record in this case it was found 
that the argument of the counsel at the hearing on Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment and the Motion for rehear-
ing were not reported and that the stipulations of coun-
sel contained therein were subsequently not made any 
part of the written record. However, most of the perti-
nent facts were not in dispute and the Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment of P. Knute Peterson, Attorney for the 
Defendants, Operating Engineers, Operating Engineers 
Trust Fund for Utah, Continental Casualty Company, 
and Pacific National Life Assurance Company dated 
April 7, 1969, is substantially in agreement with the fol-
lowing facts. 
Mr. Russell L. Marriot died on September 16, 1964, 
as a result of an accident which occurred in the course 
of his employment with Skyline Construction Company, 
Inc., and the Defendants do not deny that he was entitled 
to the privileges of a member of the Operating Engineers , 
2 
Union and had worked sufficient hours to qualify under 
a Group Insurance Plan of the Operating Engineers Trust 
Fun<l for Utah. 
The basic features of this insurance program, so far 
as introduced in evidence to date, consist of a booklet 
with the cover printed in green and the title "Operating 
Engineers Trust Fund for Utah-Group Insurance Pro-
gram, III Volume reprint January, 1964, Ql-71742-A-
43." This program provided for $2,000.00 life insurance 
coverage and $2,000.00 accidental death benefit and De-
fendants have refused to honor the claim for the same 
alleging that the insurance had not yet become effective, 
that is that the effective date of coverage had not passed 
prior to the death of Russell L. Marriot. 
It is the contention of the Defendants that Mr. Mar-
riot had worked 300 hours at the end of September and 
that consequently his insurance would have become effec-
tive on November 1, 1964, and that since he died before 
that time, he was not entitled to insurance coverage de-
spite the fact that all of the requirements had otherwise 
been met. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THAT THE INSURANCE COVERAGE AS SET 
FORTH IN THE BOOKLET FOR JANUARY, 1964, 
Ql-71742-A43 CONTAINED A WAIVER OF THE 
REQUIREMENTS AND THAT THE DECEASED, 
RUSSELL L. MARRIOT, MET THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR COVERAGE, EXCEPT SUCH REQUIREMENTS 
AS WERE WAIVED IN SAID GROUP INSURANCE 
PROGRAM. 
Page 6 of the Insurance Booklet contains the follow-
3 
ing waiver, speaking of the effective date of the insurance. 
"If you are not in active regular employment on account 
of injury or sickness on the date your insurance '' oulcl 
have become effective as indicated above, your insurance 
will become effective on the date you return to full time 
work or availability for work; except that if you become 
disabled while actively at work between the date on which 
you complete the necessary hours per eligibility L!'cn the 
date your eligibility actually begins, your insurance will 
take effect as indicated above.'" 
This same booklet then continues, on the same page 
6, with four instances when the insurance terminates and 
admittedly none of them cover the situations now before 
the Court. 
If the insurance company had intended that the 
beneficiary should not be entitled to any benefits if he 
died while on the job, and after completing the require-
ments concerning working hours and membership, the 
insurance companies could have adequately and clearly 
made provision by listing a fifth reason for the insurance 
terminating, and as will be pointed out more fully later, 
the deceased had performed every act that was necessary 
to qualify and had given full consideration for coverage, 
also that if there is any doubt or ambiguity it should be 
resolved in favor of the insured. 
II. IF THE WAIVER OF TI-IE REQUIREMENT 
AS SET FORTH IN TI rn PRECEDING ARGUMENT 
DOES NOT CREATE A CLEAR W AIYER, THEN AT 
LEAST THERE IS AN AMBIGUITY AND THIS AM-
BIGUITY SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF 
THE APPELLANT. 
1 Italics supplied. 
4 
The ambiguity, if any, is created by the contention 
of the Defendants that death is not a disability and of 
cot· it is widely held that in policies providing for 
health and disability coverage, the coverage does not ap-
ply if the person actually dies, but this is a totally differ-
ent context than the one now before the Court which 
seeks to deny to the Defendant benefits which have been 
earned and paid for by the labor of the deceased, Russell 
L. Marriot. Going again to th qualification contained on 
page 6 of the insurance booklet, there is a waiver for in-
jury, sickness, or disability and the question is whether 
the insurance can take effect when the insured person 
has in fact died. This, we submit, creates the only ambig-
uity herein and if such is an ambiguity the law concern-
ing the resolution of it is quite extensive. 
Starting with Insurance Law and Practice by Apple-
man, we find the statements and citations which follow. 
"If the insurance contract is ambiguous as to 
the date which should control, a construction 
favorable to the insured is taken."2 
"It has been almost the unanimous holding 
of all courts that insurance contracts must be lib-
erally construed in favor of a policyholder or bene-
ficiary thereof, whenever possible, and strictly 
construed against the insurer in order to afford 
the protection which the insured was endeavoring 
to secure when he applied for insurance. s The 
"12 Insurance Law & Practice 240, §7171 (Axtell v American Live-
stock Ins. Co. 1923, 194 N.W. 652, 46 SD 498). 
'ID 13 at page 50, §7401 (Richards v Standard Accident Ins. Co., 
1921, 200 P 1017, 58 Utah 622, 17 ALR 1183; Colovos v Home 
Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 1934, 28 Pac. 2d 607, 83 Utah 401; Gib-
son v Equitable Life Assur. Soc of U.S. 1934, 36 P 2d 105, 84 
Utah 452; Browning v Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S. 1937, 
72 P 2d 1060, 94 Utah 532, rehearing denied, 80 P 2d 348, 94 
Utah 570). 
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courts have felt that the language of insurance 
policies is selected by one of the parties alone, and 
the language employed by the parties should be 
construed against it.' Thus if the meaning of the 
words employed is doubtful or uncertain, or if any 
reason or ambiguity exists either in the policy as a 
whole or in portions thereof, the insured should 
have the benefit of a favorable construction in 
such instance." 
"The Courts have frequently stated that the 
provisions limiting liability of the insurer-such 
as exceptions from coverage, exclusions, restric-
tions, and conditions-are particularly deserving 
of strict construction so as not to cut down the 
coverage which the insured believed he was pur-
chasing. This rule applies also to those matters 
which are purely procedural in their nature, so 
as to make available the rights which have accrued 
to the insured under the policy. And the Courts 
are inclined to give a liberal construction to war-
ranties, particularly in holding them to be mere 
representations, unless the intention of the parties 
is so clear that the court has no alternative but to 
enforce them as written." 
The pocket part of the cited section goes on to say 
4 Ibid-footnote states: "There is another principle applying to 
contracts of insurance to the effect that if they are drawn as 
to require interpretation and fairly susceptible on t:vo differ-
ent versions the one will be adopted most favorable to the 
insured; and will be liberally construed in favor of the object 
to be accomplished and the conditions and provisions therein 
will be strictly construed against the insurer, as they are issued 
upon printed fom15 prepared by experts at the instance of the 
insurer, and the preparation of which the insured has no 
voice." (Guarantee Trust Co. v Continental Life Ins. Co. 
1930, 294 P 585, at page 587, 159 Wash. 683). 
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"* * * the insurer has the burden of sustaining a 
construction in its favor where the policy is sus-
ceptible of a construction in favor of the insured."5 
"An insurance contract must be construed 
most favorably to the insured regardless of the 
amount of premium paid by the insured. Where 
a doubt arises as to the effective date of a policy, 
a provision must be construed, if possible, in favor 
of the insured."6 
Concerning the question as to whether the deceased 
was injured, sick, or disabled, American Jurisprudence in 
discussing such terms as disability, immediate and con-
tinuous disability and other terms, states that irrespective 
of the technical variations in the language employed, the 
term "total disability" should be given a rational and 
practical construction. It is a rule of Jurisprudence indi-
cating a policy of the law to give a rational and practical 
construction and it is appellant's contention that the only 
rational construction of the language in the insurance 
booklet would be that the waiver contained in the insur-
ance booklet would include the facts in this case and that 
to rule otherwise would create a forfeiture and failure of 
consideration as further discussed in this brief.1 
5 13 Insurance Law & Practice 106, §7405. (American Fid. and 
Cas. Co. v Williams, Tex Cixil Ap 1931, 34 SW 2d 397, 402, 
which says: "The general rule is that a contract of insurance 
will be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in 
favor of the insured, and this rule applies to all provisions 
relating to a forfeiture of the rights of the insured and to any 
language in the policy regarding exceptions, warranties, and 
conditions, and if said language is not clear, it is ambiguous 
and uncertain, any doubt as to the meaning thereof will be 
resolved against the insurer."). 
"Ibid at 133, §7424. 
7 44 Am Jur 2d 496, §1606. 
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It is the contention of the Plaintiff and Appellant 
that the wording contained in the second paragraph on 
page 5 of the insurance booklet should be interpreted, at 
most, to set the date when the benefits can be collected 
because under ordinary circumstances p'.lyment \vould be 
due when the event insured against happened, or proof 
of it happening was submitted, unless there is a time 
specified in the policy; furthermore this provision would 
also apply to the time when benefits for regular disability 
would start to accrue.' 
The case of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company 
vs. Evans is also of interest in connection with interpre-
tation of insurance policies, and especially group insur-
ance policies.9 This case involved a group insurance pol-
icy which provided for payment for permanent and total 
disability provided the disability commenced one year 
after the insurance became effective. In this case the pol-
icy was issued July 7, 1931, and the injury occurred No-
vember 6, 1931, less than six months after its issuance. 
The jury was charged that if total and permanent dis-
ability did not occur until after the insurance had been 
in effect one year they could find for evidence and the 
Court of Appeals of Georgia held that the charge was not 
in error even though the accident causing the disability 
had happened prior to the expiration of the year since 
total disability was a question of fact and may not have 
commenced until the policy had in fact been in effect for 
one year. 
Before leaving the matter of ambiguity and interpre-
8 See 46 CJS 135, §1197. 
9 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v Evans, Ga 1936, 189 SE 369; rehear-
ing denied December, 1936. 
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tation, perhaps it would he well to consider the case of 
Vviernecke v Pacific Fidelity Life Insurance Company.1° 
This c , held that as to certain insurance transactions, 
cu" crnge obtDined is that which the ordinary layman, 
acting in ordinary course of business, would reasonably 
expect by virtue of the transaction, and insurance sup-
ported by his contract will be determined accordingly 
unle::;s it is made clear to him that the coverage provided 
by tbc Contract does not conform to what an ordinary 
lc1.yman might reasonably expect under the circumstances. 
The subject case arose out of an application which was 
made for insurance subject to revocation by the Company 
within a certain period upon finding the person to be 
uninsurable and the application was received July 17, 
1962, and the insured died August 3, 1962. In deciding 
the case the Court said, "To the ordinary layman, pay-
ment of an insurance premium constitutes payment for 
insurance protection." Admittedly this case is not directly 
in point but appellant believes that it is persuasive since 
it appears that there are no cases squarely in point on 
the issues being presented to the honorable Court. 
III. THAT THE DECEASED HAD PERFORMED 
ALL OF THE ACTS WHICH CONSTITUTED THE 
CONS ID ERA TION FOR THE INSURANCE COVER-
AGE, AND TI-IA T THE ST A TED EFFECTIVE DA TE 
or THE POLICY w i\S A CONDITION SUBSE-
QUENT FORMING NO PART OF THE CONSIDER-
ATION AND THEREFORE PERFORMANCE OF THE 
SAME SHOULD BE EXCUSED AND TO RULE 
OTHERWISE WOULD RESULT IN A FORFEITURE. 
The deceased, Russell L. Marriot, had, by working 
10 Wernecke v Pacific Fid. Life Ins. Co., Cal. December 20, 1965, 
48 Cal. Rptr. 251. 
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the number of hours required, given full consideration 
for insurance coverage and apparently there would be 
no question that had he been injured and survived, in 
any State whether conscious or unconscious, until Novem-
ber 1, 1964, his estate would have been entitled to the 
full amount of the insurance coverage as set forth in the 
insurance booklet. 
In connection with this we should look at Restate-
ment of Contracts which states, 
"Excuse of Condition That Involves Forfeiture. A 
condition may be excused without other reason if 
its requirement (a) would involve extreme forfei-
ture or penalty, and ( b) its existence or occurrence 
forms no essential part of the exchange for the 
promisor's performance. " 11 
Continuing on the same question, Williston on Con-
tracts states as follows: 
"Impossibility that would discharge the duty to 
perform a promise excuses a condition if (a) the 
debt for performance rendered has already arisen 
and the condition relates only to the time when 
the debt is to be discharged, or (b) existence or 
occurrence of the condition is no material part of 
the exchange or the promisor's performance and 
the discharge of the promisor will operate as a 
forfeiture. 
"Both the general rule and the exceptions 
find frequent application in the law of insur-
ance."12 
The section cited goes on to explain that failure to com-
ply with the conditions of a policy which forms a mate-
11 Restatement of Contracts, §302. 
12 5 Will. 870, §808. 
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rial part of the return performance, such as payment of 
or changing the risk would preclude enforce-
;11ent •. ut in the case at hand the premiums have been 
paid throuf!;h working required hours and since there is 
no change of risk it appears that under both the Restate-
ment and Williston the appellant is entitled to return 
performance and consideration from the respondents. 
In this same line of thought, in the case of Kentucky 
I Iome Mutual Life Insurance Company v Marshall the 
Court said, 
"We think that Marshall (the insured) did every-
thing that it was possible for him to do. He paid 
his initiation fee, dues, and advance premiums, 
and made out his application for insurance which 
was sent to the company and approved by it. ... " 13 
To rule against the Plaintiff and Appellant in this 
case would result in a forfeiture since it is not contested 
that the premiums were paid into the Fund by the em-
ployer, pursuant to contracts with the union. The pre-
miums so paid were a part of the earnings of the deceased 
and to rule in favor of the Defendants would be a forfei-
ture of the premiums where all of the conditions had 
been met, except for the alleged waiting time for vesting 
of the rights to the insurance. It has been a unanimous 
and long standing policy of the Courts to avoid forfei-
tures. In this connection Williston on Contracts states, 
in part, 
'From an early date, forfeitures have been sternly 
contemplated and frowned upon by the Courts; 
and the cases generally hold that forfeiture pro-
1:1 Kentucky Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v Marshall, Ken. 1942, 163 
SW 2d 45, 291 Ky 120. 
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visions are strictly construed. Thus, in o. suit for 
construction of a deed upon a condition subse-
quent involving a forfeiture, the Court said: 'for-
feitures are not favored by our laws .... the courts 
will not declare a forfeiture, unless they are com-
pelled to do so, by language which will not admit 
of but one construction and that construction is 
such as compels forfeiture. 
'Forfeiture clauses fail in the event they are 
ambiguously expressed .... If the provision is am-
biguous, that alone condemns it as a forfeiture 
provision. A forfeiture should rest on surer ground . 
. . . The authority to forfeit a vested right or estate 
should not rest in provisions whose meaning is 
uncertain or obscure. It should be found only in 
language which is plain and clear, whose unequiv-
ocal character may render its exercise fair and 
rightful.' "u 
The foregoing language is clear, but if there should 
be any question concerning the problem of sickness, in-
jury, disability and death, as we have in the present case, 
Williston goes on to explain that the one writing the con-
tract can by exactness in his expression prevent any mis-
takes in: meaning and that a person writing the contract 
is in a position to prevent these doubts while the person 
who accepts it does not in reality have this same oppor-
tunity; and concludes that any ambiguity of language 
should be resolved in favor of the person who accepts the 
writing of another, which in this case would be resolving 
in favor of the appellant. 10 
IV. IT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO PUBLIC 
POLICIES AND INEQUITABLE TO ALLOW THE 
RESPONDENT TO KEEP THE CONSIDERATION 
14 4 Will. 333, §602a. 
15 Ibid 760, §621. 
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GIVEN AND AT THE SAME TIME TO AVOID ALL 
LIABILITY UNDER THE INSURANCE COVERAGE. 
To ··ule in favor of the Defendants and Respondents 
,., , 1u1J, in cffrct, allow them to accept premiums and then 
\ oicl the insvrance under the terms of coverage which 
they had written, even where there had been full com-
pliance with all of the provisions but where the insured, 
under unusual circumstances had done everything other 
tlrnn continuing to live, even if in a coma, until a certain 
date had passed; and would result in an inequitable situ-
ation which is not favored in the law as shown above. 
Also, we would run into a rather peculiar defect in 
the law wherein if the insured had been fired and been 
entitled to conversion privileges, the life insurance policy 
would have been held valid under the laws of Utah .. 1 " 
This provides that if a person shall die who is covered by a 
group life insurance policy, such policy must contain a 
provision that he continues to be insured during the pe-
riod within which he would have been entitled to have 
an individual policy issued to him. It also provides that 
the amount of the life insurance to which he would have 
been entitled shall be p8yablc as a claim under the group 
policy, \\·hether or not application for the individual pol-
icy or payment of the first premium has been made.11 
Under the circumstances just cited, where a person 
has the privilege of converting insurance after employ-
ment terminates and before he is able to actually com-
plete tlie conversion he is entitled to coverage. Under 
these circumstances to find against the appellant and 
plaintiff would make it impossible for a person who was 
1
" 31-23-17 Utah Codes Annotated, 1953. 
17 Ibid 31-23-15 and 16, Utah Codes Annotated, 1953. 
13 
on the job, and killed on the job to nrnid forfeiture or all 
his rights. It is the clear intention of these sections to 
avoid forfeiture of insurance and allmv for conversiun of 
equity in the insur:mce to prevent a \\inclfall to insurnncc 
companies and recognizes a public policy of pre\·cntin; 
forfci tures and windfalls. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff and Appellant believes that the evidence 
thus far introduced, ;1.s a m;!tter of la\\', should be resolved 
in favor of the Plaintiff and Judgment entered nccord-
ingly. There was a waiver contained within the insurance 
booklet, the master policy never having yet been entered 
into evidence, which contains a waiver sufficient to find 
for the Plaintiff, and if there are any ambiguities therein 
we believe that the law clearly states that the ambiguities 
should be resolved in favor of the Appellant since the 
consideration for the insurance coverage had in fact been 
fully performed and to hold otherwise would result in a 
forfeiture which is not favored by the Courts and further-
more that such a forfeiture \\'ould be contrary to public 
policy. 
In view of the Court granting a Summary Judgment 
and not entering Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, and there being no record of the arguments and 
stipulations, by reason of practice of the Court, and as an 
alternative to finding for the appellant we feel that the 
matter should be remanded to the District Court for fur-
ther proceedings and trial of the matter on its merits with 
the usual prerogative of either party to request a trial by 
jury if they should so desire. 
Respectfully submitted, 
14 
ARDEN E. COOMBS 
Attorney for Appellant 
